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Note
In Re the Welfare of Due Process
Kristin K. Zinsmaster*
On a fall evening in November 2006, a fifteen-year-old boy
named S.C. walked into a convenience store in northern Min-
nesota.' Prior to that night, S.C.'s criminal record consisted of
just one short line.2 In his hurry to get some cash out of the reg-
ister, S.C. shot at the two men working behind the store's coun-
ter 3-he hit each of them three times; one of them was shot in
the back as the man tried to escape. 4
Though S.C.'s offense was frighteningly violent, his defense
attorneys worked tirelessly to keep their young client out of the
criminal justice system, and in the juvenile court.5 Like many
juvenile offenders,6 S.C. struggled with many personal issues.
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Professors Barry Feld and David Weissbrodt at the Law School, and Jeff
Maahs at UMD, for substantive and structural guidance in writing this Note,
as well as the Sixth Judicial District Public Defender for invaluable informa-
tion and exposure. Many thanks also to key editors on the Minnesota Law Re-
view, including Liz Borer and Anna Richey-Allen. My most heartfelt thanks to
those of you who lived the drama of Spring 2009 with me (you know who you
are) and to Eric, my biggest fan. And, finally, it is children like S.C. and L.M.
who time and again remind us that the world is full of problems bigger than
our own-and that these, too, are surmountable. Thank you to them, and to
those who work tirelessly on their behalf, most of all. Copyright C 2009 by
Kristin K. Zinsmaster.
1. In re S.A.C., No. A07-1109, 2008 WL 170580, at *1, *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2008).
2. See id. at *2 n.2.
3. Id. at *1.
4. Id.
5. See generally id. at *1-3 (providing an account of the trial court certi-
fication hearing). The interlocutory appeal itself further indicates a great deal
of effort to keep S.C. in juvenile court.
6. See EDWARD HUMES, No MATTER How LOUD I SHOUT: A YEAR IN THE
LIFE OF JUVENILE COURT 73 (1996) (noting that many children in juvenile
court make "claims of terrible abuse, all of it documented and indisputable").
This common-sense conclusion is supported by psychiatric research. See Karen
M. Abram et al., Cornorbid Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Deten-
tion, 60 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1097, 1098-99 (2003) (noting that
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At fifteen, he had a substance abuse problem, 7 mental health
concerns,8 and a history of domestic abuse and instability. 9 The
district court spent three days hearing arguments during his
certification to stand trial as an adult,10 including the opinions
of multiple psychiatric professionals." In 2008, after the dis-
trict court judge certified him to stand trial as an adult, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed the record of that hear-
ing.12
S.C.'s defense attorneys expended a great deal of time and
energy to keep him in juvenile court.13 The rationale behind
this effort lies in what are seen as the fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult criminal justice-different judicial
processes, due process protections, and sentencing goals. 14
S.C.'s attorneys wanted to keep him in juvenile court because of
its perceived protections against unfair publicity, its rehabilita-
tive sentencing philosophy, and its attitude of parental care,' 5
but their rationale may have been misguided. Unfortunately,
the juvenile system has changed dramatically since its incep-
tion.16 Juvenile courts today mirror the more punitive adult
system, with the difference being that they lack the due process
protections of the latter.17 Young offenders are sentenced under
codes that list as their first priority "public safety," rather than
rehabilitation.18 Like adults, they are incarcerated in correc-
many abused children are at a high risk of "cycl[ing] through" the juvenile jus-
tice system and further finding substantial rates of comorbidity, or the co-
occurrence of mental health and substance abuse problems, among detained
youth).
7. In re S.A.C., 2008 WL 170580, at *1 n.1, *3.
8. Id. at *1-2.
9. See id. at *2 n.2.
10. Id. at *2.
11. See id. at *1-3.
12. Mark Stodghill, Court: Consider Teen an Adult, DULUTH NEWS TRIB.,
Jan. 23, 2008, at B1.
13. See generally In re S.A.C., 2008 WL 170580, at *1 (interlocutory ap-
peal of adult certification).
14. See generally JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY
46-60 (1998) (describing foundational philosophies of juvenile justice).
15. See id. at 47-50.
16. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early
Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CEN-
TURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 43 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002)
(noting changes in the juvenile system).
17. See Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress
or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 253-54 (2007).
18. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 168 (Kan. 2008).
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tional facilities,19 and may be required to register as offenders
for certain crimes. 20 Often, information about their offense is
made public. 21
This Note argues that the juvenile justice system has be-
come as punitive, as public, and as formalistic as the adult sys-
tem. Therefore, juveniles are entitled to a trial by jury. Part I
provides a brief history of the right to a jury trial, and describes
the juvenile system as it functions today. Part II analyzes the
legal precedent in this area and examines the ways in which
systemic change and statistical realities should inform the
question of whether juries are necessary in juvenile court. Part
III proposes an answer to this question. The right to a jury trial
must be provided to juvenile offenders as long as the system
remains punitive, but the juvenile system must eventually re-
turn to its rehabilitative roots. An ultimatum to provide key
due process protections like the jury would perhaps hasten this
return to rehabilitation. This in turn would enable courts to
more effectively address cases similar to S.C.'s and vindicate
efforts to keep such cases within the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion.
I. A JURY OF ONE'S PEERS AND THE JUVENILE COURT
One cannot appreciate the necessity of the right to a jury
trial in the juvenile court system without first understanding
the place of the jury in United States law. The Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments combine to provide for the right to trial by
jury in criminal proceedings. 22 The jury importantly checks the
power of the state,23 and is the only such procedural safeguard
mentioned three times in the Constitution. 24 Courts and com-
mentators have debated the value of the jury trial at length,
providing the rich history discussed below. The following sec-
tions also trace the history of the juvenile court system from its
progressive roots to its modern purpose, and address the sys-
tem's current practical realities.
19. Id. at 169.
20. Id. at 165.
21. Id. at 170.
22. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. In these pertinent parts, the Constitu-
tion provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" and "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Id.
23. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amends. VI, VII.
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A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The nature of the right to a jury trial in the United States
is perhaps best expressed by the Supreme Court in Duncan v.
Louisiana.25 In that seminal case, the Court used the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to incorporate the
right to trial by jury against the states.26 The Court found that
the right to a jury was "fundamental to the American scheme of
justice,"27 and, although it was perhaps conceivable to develop
another mechanism for a fair trial, our nation had yet to im-
plement any such alternative. 28 Juries are perceived as bas-
tions against government oppression, and as common-sense
checks on the law; they ensure that justice, and a defendant's
constitutional rights, are protected. 29 Our founders relied on ju-
ries to prevent bias and oppression, and to facilitate accurate
fact-finding. 30 A fair trial without a jury was difficult to im-
agine.3 1
Despite the historic enthusiasm for providing a defendant
with a jury of his peers, debate rages over the continuing valid-
ity and cost-effectiveness of the jury.32 Commentators suggest
that juries cannot correctly apply complicated law, 33 especially
to difficult scientific or business-related facts. 34 Some posit that
juries may improperly engage in nullification,3 5 and require
25. See generally Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145.
26. Id. at 148-49.
27. Id. at 149.
28. Id. at 150 n.14.
29. See id. at 155-56 (describing the rationales behind providing juries in
criminal trials, which include acting as a check on the inherent power of the
prosecutor and the judge, and preventing "against arbitrary law enforce-
ment").
30. See id. at 155-57.
31. See id. at 152-53 (recounting the historic emphasis on the right to tri-
al by jury).
32. See generally STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 377-82
(2d ed. 2004) (describing the different sides of the debate over the modern civil
jury). This debate is largely fought in the realm of civil procedure; criminal
cases, specifically those that carry the possibility of incarceration or death,
have always been seen as different. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157-58. The cost-
benefit analysis weighs heavily in favor of a jury of one's peers in this context.
Cf. id. at 145 (stating that severity of punishment is relative to the level of
constitutional protection).
33. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV.
1055, 1062-63 (1964).
34. Cf. id. at 1069-72 (noting problems inherent in jury determinations of
fees in personal injury cases).
35. See SUBRIN, supra note 32, at 378 (quoting JEROME T. FRANK, COURTS
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more time and money than they are worth.36 Others argue,
however, that juries are fully capable of understanding the law
and its application, so long as the elements are properly ex-
plained in the courtroom.37 Further, serving on a jury may be
an important component of civic engagement, and may enhance
citizens' level of ownership over the system.38 To the extent
that juries take more time and cost more money, this expense is
perhaps a small price to pay for fundamental fairness.
Despite the ongoing debate, juries have long been consi-
dered an indispensable requirement when the case carries the
penalty of serious punishment.39 This assertion perhaps holds
especially true in settings rife with the specific problems that
juries are meant to address. 40 One candidate for such a set-
ting-the juvenile court system-is discussed below.
B. BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
Progressive reformers created the nation's first juvenile
justice system in Chicago in 189941 with the understanding
that it would be qualitatively different from the criminal sys-
tem used to prosecute adult offenders.42 Reformers built the ju-
venile system on the premise of parens patriae,43 the belief that
young offenders are different from adult offenders. 44 They con-
ceived of the system as an alternative to funneling children di-
rectly into the criminal justice system.45 Although proceedings
in juvenile court were initially open to the public, juvenile
ON TRIAL 110-11, 129-30 (1949)).
36. See Kalven, supra note 33, at 1055, 1059-67.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1062.
39. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
40. See id. at 156. Such problems include arbitrariness, prosecutorial
overreaching, and probable bias.
41. See Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (codified as
amended at 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/1-2).
42. See generally WATKINS, supra note 14, at 46 (describing the founding
theories of juvenile justice).
43. Id. at 47. The doctrine parens patriae, which originated in the chan-
cery jurisprudence of ancient England, roughly translates to "the state as par-
ent." Id. at 9.
44. See id. at 46 (the desire to "disassociate" juvenile law from the general
criminal common law reflects the belief that children are different from adults
in ways that require legal differentiation); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569-71 (2005) (suggesting that some level of the understanding that "kids
are different" remains today, at least in the capital punishment context).
45. See WATKINS, supra note 14, at 47.
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courts would later become "sheltered place[s]," 46 where young
offenders would avoid the stigma of public disapproval, 47 and
where the focus would be "treatment, supervision, and control
rather than punishment."48 To realize the goal of successful re-
habilitation, juvenile courts would "exercise[] broad discretion
to intervene in the lives of young offenders" 49 and would be
nonadversarial, such that the trappings of the criminal sys-
tem-its terminology, its facilities, and its fundamental due
process protections-would be unnecessary.50
The Warren Court recognized the problems inherent in
this rejection of due process protections in In re Gault.51 Here,
the Court held that the juvenile system needed to afford juve-
nile offenders many of the same due process rights enjoyed by
adults to ensure that justice was done. 52 Commentators note
that In re Gault set off a process of "constitutional domestica-
tion"53 whereby the Court recognized the necessity of due
process in juvenile court proceedings, even though the system
was "separate" from the adult system. 54 Constitutional domes-
tication continued in the form of cases such as In re Winship,
which set "beyond a reasonable doubt" as the standard of proof
in juvenile cases.55
Some proponents of the "kids are different" ideology la-
mented this development as a blurring of the lines between ju-
venile and criminal court.56 These decisions, however, forced
the legal community to recognize that juvenile courts were dif-
46. Tanenhaus, supra note 16, at 42-43.
47. See WATKINS, supra note 14, at 49-50.
48. Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the
Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV., 1111, 1138
(2003).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1138-39.
51. 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967).
52. See id. at 13 ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone."); id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 562 (1966) (further holding that juvenile court proceedings must "meas-
ure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment")).
53. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 48, at 1140.
54. Id. at 1142.
55. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
56. See generally, HUMES, supra note 6, at 25 (providing a general over-
view of arguments against constitutional domestication, including the obser-
vation that "[tlhirty years later, the system has yet to recover from that one
lewd phone call, or from the hidden price tag attached to the reforms [In re
Gault] spawned").
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ferent in name, but not in practice or outcome, than the adult
courts from which children were supposedly insulated.5 7 The
word delinquent "ha[d] come to involve only slightly less stigma
than the term 'criminal' applied to adults."58 In light of this
fact, Justice Fortas called for a "candid appraisal" of the
"claimed benefits of the juvenile process." 59 Today, state legisla-
tures and courtso continue to debate juvenile justice policy and
discuss which due process protections must be afforded to
young offenders in juvenile court.61
C. MODERN REALITIES OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
There is more to this story than the historical underpin-
nings of the jury trial and the juvenile court. The modern reali-
ties of juvenile justice, including which juveniles are involved,
where they are sent, and the practical effects of their adjudica-
tion, must inform an analysis of the issue as well.
1. Juveniles in the System
The most current compilation of statistics put out by the
57. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 773 (1966). The Court cited this study in In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 20. Examples of more recent studies revealing the similarity be-
tween juvenile justice outcomes and criminal outcomes abound. See, e.g.,
NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2003-2004,
at ix (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview of juvenile justice contacts
and processing from 1985-2004); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/
ojstatbb/default.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
58. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 24.
59. Id. at 21.
60. Juvenile justice is largely a creature of state law. Federal law provides
that a juvenile "shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United
States unless the Attorney General . . . certifies to the appropriate district
court" that a State has, or will take, no jurisdiction over the juvenile; pro-
grams and/or services are not currently available in state court; or the offense
is a violent controlled substance offense in which the federal government has
"substantial" interest. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006). The Juvenile Justice and De-
linquency Prevention Act of 2002 further states as its purpose to "assist state
and local governments" in addressing juvenile crime. 42 U.S.C. § 5602 (2006).
For this reason, splits among state courts on juvenile justice issues are salient.
61. See, e.g., State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Minn. 2006) (discuss-
ing whether courts can consider juvenile crimes decided without a jury to cal-
culate sentencing for later adult crimes without violating due process); Assem.
4792, 232d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009) (proposing a bill of rights for juveniles in the
juvenile justice system); Assem. 223, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2009/data/AB-223.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2009) (recommending a right to trial by jury for juvenile offenders).
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National Center for Juvenile Justice62 provides the short an-
swer to the question of who ends up in the juvenile justice sys-
tem and in juvenile detention facilities. The incarcerated popu-
lation is overwhelmingly African-American, male, and under
the age of sixteen. 63 The characteristics of the kids most likely
to end up in the system are disturbing from the perspective of
racial equality. Accordingly, the federal government passed leg-
islation requiring states to take efforts to reduce "disproportio-
nate minority contact" in order to be eligible for certain federal
funds.64
In spite of such efforts to reduce disproportionate minority
contact in the juvenile justice system, the problem remains.65
Furthermore, a report submitted to the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention in 200766 indicates that it
cannot be explained away by suggesting that certain racial
groups commit more crime.67 Although the study is reluctant to
conclude that racial bias is the singular cause of
disproportionate contact,6 8 it asserts that "[disproportionate
minority contact] can not [sic] be explained by differences in the
offending behavior of different racial groups" 69 and "the weight
of the evidence suggests that the effect of race/ethnicity on the
chance of being contacted/referred is reduced but remains
significant when both offending and risk are controlled."70
Differences in offending cannot explain away the numerical
62. See NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 57.
63. Id. at 9, 12, 26.
64. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002, 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006) (requiring states, in order to be eligible for "formu-
la grants," to "address juvenile delinquency prevention efforts and system im-
provement efforts designed to reduce . . . the disproportionate number of juve-
nile members of minority groups, who come into contact with the juvenile
justice system").
65. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 20-21.
66. DAVID HUIZINGA ET AL., DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A STUDY OF DIFFERENTIAL MINORITY AR-
REST/REFERRAL TO COURT IN THREE CITIES, at i, 32 (2007) [hereinafter DMC
REPORT].
67. See id. at i; cf. NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, AND
JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 6, 37 (2007) (asserting that minority youths receive "differ-
ent" treatment in the justice system).
68. HUIZINGA ET AL., supra note 66, at ii.
69. Id. at iii.
70. Id. at ii.
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disparities.71 The possibility of racial bias in juvenile justice is
an important aspect of who is locked up; the question of where
offenders go is also important.
2. Juvenile Facilities
The facilities in which the system houses juvenileS72 who
are adjudicated delinquent 73 for serious offenseS 74 are often
considered the last stop before confinement in an adult facili-
ty-essentially, they are miniature prisons.75 In Minnesota,
judges commit serious juvenile offenders to a correctional facili-
ty in Red Wing.76 The same facility also houses adult offend-
ers. 77 Although the punishment rationale for incarcerating the
adult offenders is supposedly different from the rehabilitative
rationale for incarcerating the juvenile offenders,78 the facility
itself is exactly the same. 79 Even if other states do not house
adult and juvenile inmates in the same place, or do not make
this fact publicly known, the mission statements and descrip-
tions of their juvenile facilities include terminology reminiscent
71. See Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile Jus-
tice Processing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 23, 61 (Darnell F. Haw-
kins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005).
72. A Minnesota statute designates the Minnesota Correctional Facility-
Red Wing for the housing of juveniles. See MINN. STAT. § 242.41 (2006).
73. See WATKINS, supra note 14, at 49, for a discussion of "adjudged de-
linquent" as a term of art in the juvenile system, mirroring the use of "con-
victed" in the adult system.
74. The statute describing the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Red Wing
does not define "serious offense." See MINN. STAT. § 242.41. For the factors
that a Minnesota juvenile court would consider when determining whether a
juvenile's conduct is serious enough to warrant detention, see MINN. R. JUV.
DEL. P. 5.03.
75. See CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: THE IN-
STITUTIONAL PARADOX 259-60 (1976) (comparing juvenile institutions to all
"total institutions"); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVE-
NILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS 197-98 (1977) (noting that adults and juve-
niles convicted of crimes will be similarly imprisoned).
76. MINN. STAT. § 242.41.
77. See Daily Inmate Profile Report, http://www.corr.state.mn.us/
facilities/tourreport/08FacilitylnmateProfile.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2009)
(recording a total of forty adult offenders housed at the facility). The report
lists only adult offenders and is updated daily.
78. See MINN. STAT. § 242.19 (2006) (providing that the purpose of a juve-
nile disposition is "treatment and rehabilitation"). A different section of the
code provides for rehabilitative programs for adults, but does not characterize
such programs as the "purpose of incarceration." MINN. STAT. § 244.03 (2006).
79. Compare MINN. STAT. § 242.41 (establishing the facility housing juve-
nile offenders), with Daily Inmate Profile Report, supra note 77 (listing adult
offenders housed at the same facility).
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of adult prison, such as "locks on the doors" and "hardware de-
signed to restrict . . . movement . . ." and "protect public safe-
ty."80
The names given to juvenile facilities are also notable. In
its decision in In re L.M, a case discussed at length below, the
Kansas Supreme Court pointed out that its "[s]tate youth cen-
ter" was now referred to as a "[j]uvenile correctional facility,"81
a term similar to that given to adult facilities in the state.82
3. Consequences of a Delinquent Adjudication
Since In re Gault, courts and commentators have recog-
nized that, although "delinquent" and "criminal" are two differ-
ent words, "[i]t is disconcerting . .. that this [former] term has
come to involve only slightly less stigma than the [latter]."83
There are many consequences of adjudication beyond this
common-sense stigmatic effect. A court may use a juvenile ad-
judication to enhance an adult sentence,84 to require a juvenile
to register as a sex offender,85 or to impeach a witness in the
courtroom. 86 These adjudications may also be available to em-
ployers or other persons searching public records.87
80. New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, Secure Detention Fa-
cilities, http://www.nyc.gov/html/djj/htmllfacilities.html (last visited Oct. 23,
2009); see also Kansas Juvenile Justice Authority, Larned Juvenile Correc-
tional Facility, http://www.jja.ks.gov/facilitieslarned.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2009); Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Juvenile Corrections, Type I
Facilities, http://www.wi-doc.com/Typelfacilities.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2009).
81. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 169 (Kan. 2008) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-2302 (2006)).
82. Id.
83. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967); see also In re Jeffrey C., 849
N.Y.S.2d 517, 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (referring to the "stigma of a juvenile
delinquent adjudication"); In re R.M., 234 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. App. 2007)
(noting the presence of the "stigma attached to being adjudged a juvenile de-
linquent").
84. See United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing
"prior juvenile adjudication" to be considered at sentencing); United States v.
Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2002) (arguing juvenile adjudica-
tions found to be procedurally sufficient may be consider that at adult sentenc-
ing).
85. See MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2006).
86. FED. R. EVID. 609.
87. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177-78
(2008) (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has "proposed adding




An important, serious consequence of a delinquent adjudi-
cation is the possibility that it may be used to enhance a per-
son's subsequent criminal sentences. Criminal defendants have
the right to force the State to prove every element of the alleged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.88 The factfinder must hear
and decide each element that the court can use to enhance a
sentence out of the range suggested by the sentencing guide-
lines.89 There is one exception to this rule, previously recog-
nized in Jones v. United States:90 the fact of a prior conviction
(usually indicated by a defendant's criminal history points) re-
quires no independent proof.91 The rule in many jurisdictions is
that a juvenile adjudication counts as a prior conviction, 92 de-
spite the fact that the person had no right to a jury.93 Courts
have upheld sentence enhancements brought about by reliance
on a defendant's juvenile record. 94
Adjudications for certain sex offenses also require a
juvenile to register as a sex offender in some states.95 Sex
offender registration is required to protect the public from
potentially dangerous persons, because sex offenders are
perceived to recidivate at higher rates and supposedly pose a
unique threat to their communities.96 Regardless of the policy
rationale, placing a juvenile's name on this public offender list
is highly stigmatic. 97 Although it may be true that a judge often
88. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475-76 (2000).
89. Id. at 476.
90. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
91. Id. at 243 n.6.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694 (3d Cir. 2003);
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2002).
93. E.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1970) (holding that
"not ... all rights constitutionally assured to an adult . . . are to be enforced or
made available to the juvenile") (emphasis added).
94. See Feld, supra note 48, at 1114 (citing both Jones, 332 F.3d at 696,
and Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033).
95. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2006) (requiring any person "con-
victed of or adjudicated delinquent for" certain predatory sexual offenses to
register) (emphasis added); In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 671-72 (Wis.
1998) (requiring any person "convicted or adjudicated delinquent ... for a sex
offense" to register) (emphasis added) (citing WIs. STAT. § 301.45 (2007)).
96. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 325-27 (2006) (discuss-
ing the original purposes behind offender registration laws).
97. See id. at 324 (characterizing "sex offender registration [as the] mod-
ern day scarlet letter"). Laws requiring registration and community notifica-
tion have been challenged even for adult offenders for this reason. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 86 (2003) (noting the "stigma" accompanying regis-
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has the discretion whether to impose this requirement, 98 the
ramifications of registration may be felt by the offender well
into adulthood. 99
Another ramification of a juvenile adjudication is found in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rules 608 and 609 provide that
when a witness places herself on the stand, she puts her
"character for truthfulness"100 at issue. Under this rationale,
the opposing side's attorney may impeach the witness with her
prior record of felonies or of crimes with an element of
dishonesty.101 Rule 609(d) provides only that juvenile
adjudications are "generally not admissible,"102 and explicitly
allows a juvenile adjudication to be used to impeach a witness
other than the accused if the judge determines that such use is
required for "fair determination of . .. guilt."103 Hence, in the
same way that a witness may end up "on trial" herself for a
prior adult conviction, so may she be "tried" and discredited
based upon a prior juvenile adjudication.10 4
Finally, to the extent that juvenile adjudications end up in
the newspapers, or as part of the public record, 05 they are
available to any entity that searches public records databas-
es.106 Courts have suggested that this is a common occur-
rence. 07 Records may thus be obtained by employers, educa-
tional institutions, housing authorities, and private data
miners who sell the information to whomever will pay for it.108
With the historical role of the jury and the juvenile justice
tration statutes despite the fact that notification requirements are non-
punitive).
98. See In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d at 671-72 (discussing factors a judge
may weigh when deciding whether to impose reporting requirements).
99. See Carpenter, supra note 96, at 334 (noting that some jurisdictions
require a "lifetime registration" even for juveniles).
100. FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(1), 609.
101. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)-(2).
102. FED. R. EVID. 609(d) (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. This is exactly what happened in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-
20 (1974).
105. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (requiring that official
juvenile files must be open to the public unless the adjudicated child is under
the age of fourteen and the judge orders the file closed in the best interests of
the child (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2309(b) (2006))).
106. Cf. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 87, at 177-78 (noting the increasing
number of entities interested in conducting public records searches for crimi-
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system (both as it was meant to be and as it is today) in mind,
this Note analyzes below the right to a jury trial in juvenile
court, in light of both legal precedent and practical realities.
II. PRECEDENT AND PRACTICE: THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT
IN JUVENILE JUSTICE TODAY
The question of whether the right to a jury trial applies to
juvenile offenders must be analyzed with attention to both legal
precedent and systemic changes; the "candid appraisal" of the
juvenile justice system called for in 1967109 continues. Legisla-
tures have debated sentencing and crime control policy, which
led in recent years to "get tough" political platforms" 0 and pu-
nitive legislative reforms.111 Courts have subsequently at-
tempted to determine to what extent those changes demand a
reassessment of the due process rights available to young of-
fenders. In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court decided that juve-
niles tried in that state are entitled to a trial by jury under the
Federal Constitution.11 2 This section will draw upon such legal
precedent, as well as the systemic developments in juvenile jus-
tice, to reexamine the jury trial question and to argue that, due
to the punitive nature of the system and its inherent biases, ju-
ries are required.
109. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
110. See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren
Court and the Conservative "Backlash,"87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1451-52 (2003)
(describing conservative politicians' use of "get tough" rhetoric in the 1990s,
which was made possible by sensational media coverage and increases in ho-
micide rates among juveniles). This sensational media coverage of violent
youth crime continues. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, When a Child Is Accused of Kill-
ing and a Law Stays Firm, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2000, at A18 (mentioning a
"nightmare epidemic of school shootings" and "killers too young to see an R-
rated movie"); Clarence Page, Crime Makes a Comeback, CHI. TRIB., July 16,
2006, at C5 (referring to "juveniles who are not content to merely rob or
steal").
111. See, e.g., 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 479 (codified as amended at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4702 (2007)) (describing the state's sentencing guidelines as
applicable to "all offenders," including juveniles); 1994 La. Acts 120 (codified
as amended at LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 407(A) (2004)) (reducing the amount
of confidentiality inherent in the juvenile system); 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 77
(codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 938.01 (2005)) (listing as the intent of the
statute to "protect citizens ... [and] to hold each juvenile offender directly ac-
countable," and relocating the juvenile code to be adjacent to the State's crimi-
nal code).
112. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 174 (Kan. 2008).
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A. LEGAL PRECEDENT: MCKEIVER (AND ITS PROGENY) TO INRE
L.M.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the only Supreme Court deci-
sion on the issue of the right to a jury trial in juvenile court, a
plurality concluded that due process in the juvenile context did
not demand the provision of this safeguard, in part because to
so require would "remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully
adversary process."113 The Court expressed concern for the
unique nature and rehabilitative focus of the juvenile system
and asserted that requiring a jury trial would do away with the
system's inherent "sympathy" and "paternal attention." 14 Jus-
tice White based his concurrence on the "differences of sub-
stance" between the juvenile and adult systems.115 Since
McKeiver, state courts have confronted the issue of jury trials
for juvenile offenders on many occasions and have nearly un-
iversally agreed with the holding in that case.116
In 2008, however, Kansas, noting the drastic transforma-
tion of the juvenile system in the years since 1971, bucked the
trend and held that juveniles charged with imprisonable of-
fenses had the constitutional right to a jury trial.117 Kansas's
decision in In re L.M. rekindles the debate concerning the goals
of juvenile justice, the realities of the system as it functions to-
day, and fundamental fairness. The opinion provides a starting
point from which to answer the question whether juvenile of-
fenders are entitled to jury trials.118 What is largely missing
from the court's analysis, however, is attention to current juve-
nile justice statistics and the historical role of the jury, both of
which are crucial to an understanding of why the jury trial is
absolutely necessary in the juvenile courtroom.
113. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (stating that "tri-
al by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional re-
quirement").
114. Id. at 547-50.
115. Id. at 551-53 (White, J., concurring). In his concurrence White relied
on what are today highly questionable premises. He asserted that, in the ju-
venile justice system, "[cloercive measures, where employed, are considered
neither retribution nor punishment," that the system went out of its way to
avoid stigmatization of individual offenders, and that confinement was not a
"measure of the seriousness of the particular act ... performed." Id. at 552.
116. See, e.g., State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34-35 (La. 2002); In re J.F.,
714 A.2d 467, 473 (Pa. 1998); In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660, 677-78 (Wis.
1998).
117. See In re L.M. 186 P.3d at 170.
118. See id. at 167-70.
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B. SYSTEMIC CHANGE-CHARACTERIZING THE PUNITIVE
PURPOSE
The juvenile justice system is not the same as when it
started. It has developed over time into a justice system that
emphasizes punishment and incapacitation as much as the
adult system. This fact was recognized in In re L.M.,119 but is
even more apparent after an examination of the practical as-
pects of the system.
1. The Steady Erosion of Rehabilitative Purposes
The premise underlying many courts' determinations that
there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings is that
the purpose of juvenile intervention is treatment as opposed to
punishment. 120 Although this premise may have been valid in
1899,121 whether it remains so today is debatable. Commenta-
tors assert that the modern juvenile court emphasizes "pu-
nishment," and that this, "rather than treatment, of delin-
quents raises fundamental questions about the adequacy of
procedural protections in the juvenile court."122 If the purposes
of the juvenile justice system have become indistinguishable
from the purposes of the adult system, there is perhaps no
principled reason why the due process rights afforded in each
system are different. 123
The Supreme Court decision in McKeiver and a number of
the state court decisions denying juveniles the right to a jury
are characterized by strong dissents pointing to the same puni-
tive developments in juvenile justice cited by commentators. 124
119. Id.
120. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544 (citing the PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967)); see also, e.g., In re J.F., 714 A.2d at 471-
72; In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d at 670.
121. See WATKINS, supra note 14, at 46-60.
122. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Pu-
nishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822
(1988).
123. See id. at 909-10 ("The current status of the juvenile court system,
which has become increasingly criminalized and more like its adult counter-
part, raises the question whether there is any reason to maintain a separate
juvenile criminal court whose sole distinguishing characteristic is its persist-
ing procedural deficiencies.").
124. See, e.g., Ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 35 (La. 2002) (Johnson, J., dis-
senting) ("Recent and numerous changes in our Juvenile Justice System re-
quire a reevaluation of fundamental fairness . . . ."); In re Hezzie R., 580
N.W.2d at 686 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[Tihese continuing sanctions 'look[],
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Even the majority decisions in these cases often concede that
the "idealistic hopes" of the juvenile justice system "have not
been realized."1 25 It was this argument that allowed the Kansas
Supreme Court to find a constitutional right to a jury trial in In
re L.M,126 in which it found that the systemic changes "super-
seded" the reasoning promulgated by the Supreme Court in
McKeiver and in an earlier Kansas case.127 The court held that,
since the "juvenile justice system is now patterned after the
adult criminal system," and the "benevolent parens patriae
character that distinguished it [is eroded] ," "juveniles have a
constitutional right to a jury trial."128
In addition to analyzing the punitive nature of juvenile ad-
judications in broad, as the above decisions have done, one
might also look to the Supreme Court's opinion in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,129 which provides a list of factors to consid-
er when determining whether something is punitive. The fac-
tors include: "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint ," "has historically been regarded as a pu-
nishment," is imposed only after a finding of mens rea, "pro-
mote[s] ... retribution and deterrence," and applies to behavior
that is already classified as a crime.130 In more recent years,
courts have applied these factors when determining whether
such policies as registration and civil commitment for "sexual
predators"131 are punitive in nature.132 It is probable that ap-
talk[], [and] smell like adult criminal code, criminal consequences'."). The dis-
sents in these and other cases rely to a large extent on changes in state statu-
tory language. See, e.g., 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 1207 (codified as amended at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4702 (2007)); 1994 La. Acts 1008 (codified as amended
at LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 407(A) (2004)); 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 1049 (codi-
fied as amended at WIS. STAT. § 938.01 (2005)).
125. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543-44; see also In re J.F., 714 A.2d at 471 (con-
ceding that the juvenile justice system in Pennsylvania had "move[d] away
from the rehabilitation and protection of juvenile offenders" but suggesting
that this merely reflected the "changing nature of juvenile crime"); Ex rel.
D.J., 817 So. 2d at 34 (recognizing that the juvenile court system in Louisiana
was "far from perfect").
126. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 171 (Kan. 2008).
127. Id. at 170 (referring to McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 and to Findlay v.
State, 681 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1984)).
128. Id.
129. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
130. Id. at 168-69 (going on to hold that the citizenship penalty at issue
was indeed punitive in nature).
131. State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 115 (Wis. 1995).
132. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 752-53 (W.D. Wash.
1995) (finding that the state's Sexually Violent Predator Statute could not be
1832009]
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plying the same factors to the juvenile justice system would in-
dicate the same erosion, and would bolster the argument made
in cases like In re L.M 1 33
As Professor Barry Feld asserts, it does make a difference
whether courts classify a sanction as punishment or treat-
ment. 134 Historically, only the treatment-based nature of the
juvenile system allowed courts to rule that juries are unneces-
sary. 135 Without this treatment-based footing to stand on, it is
difficult to determine whether the decisions disallowing jury
trials would stand.
The similarities between juvenile and adult criminal
justice1 36 are illustrative. These similarities, however, are not
the only way to define the true purpose of modern juvenile
justice. An examination of the facilities in which juveniles are
incarcerated, and of the consequences of a delinquent
adjudication, leads to the same conclusion. Mission statements
may alone indicate a punitive purpose, but what the system
actually does with juvenile offenders is even stronger evidence
that youth are being punished, and not treated.
2. Where Offenders Are Sent Says Something About Why
They Are Sent There
When the same facility is used to house both juvenile of-
fenders and adult offenders, the purposes of confinement in
that facility may be the same for both populations. This is one
conclusion to be drawn from the situation in the correctional
facility in Red Wing, Minnesota, wherein both juvenile and
adult inmates are housed in the same facility. 137 Concededly,
construed as civil); Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d at 113 (finding that commitment of
"sexually violent persons" was not punishment oriented).
133. For example, using the factors in conjunction with statutory language
and structure would bolster the assertion that "[the] changes to the juvenile
justice system have eroded the benevolent parens patriae character that dis-
tinguished it from the adult criminal system." In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170.
134. See generally Feld, supra note 122. The article is aptly subtitled "Pu-
nishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes" (emphasis added).
135. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 552 (1971) (White,
J., concurring).
136. For example, the similarities in terminology and statutory structure
are striking, and form the basis of the court's decision in In re L.M., 186 P.3d
at 168-71.
137. See Facility Information for the Minnesota Correctional Facility in
Red Wing, http://www.corr.state.mn.us/facilities/redwing.htm (last visited Oct.
23, 2009) (illustrating the fact that the facility houses both juvenile and adult
offenders).
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one could imagine the argument that keeping juvenile and
adult populations separate from each other would remedy the
problem. In the Red Wing example, this assertion would fail to
fully address the fact that the environment within the facility
does not vary based on whether the population is adult or juve-
nile. 138
Troublingly, many states now call their juvenile detention
centers by the same names as their adult facilities 139 and in-
clude prison-like language in the descriptions of the centers.140
It may be true that a state could offer the juveniles housed in a
particular facility, whatever its name, opportunities for treat-
ment and more favorable living conditions not offered to adults.
The literature on conditions of confinement in juvenile deten-
tion facilities, however, points in the opposite direction.141
The report published by the Justice Policy Institute sug-
gests that the 591 secure juvenile facilities in this country suf-
fer the same malaise as do jails and prisons housing adult of-
fenders. 142 The facilities are overcrowded, understaffed, and
138. Cf. id. (providing no indication that any portion of the facility, con-
structed in 1889, varies according to the age of the inmate housed there); Vir-
tual Tour of MCF-Red Wing, http://www.corr.state.mn.us/aboutdoc/tour/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (providing only one example of a secu-
rity unit, suggesting that all the security units within the facility are the
same).
139. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 169 (referring to the fact that a juvenile
detention center is now known as a "[jiuvenile correctional facility" (quoting
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2302 (2006))); cf. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 169 (noting that
a facility for juvenile detention was previously termed a "[s]tate youth center"
(quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1602(g) (1982) (repealed 2006))).
140. See, e.g., New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, Secure Facil-
ities, http://www.nyc.gov/html/djj/html/facilities.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2009) (describing the facility as being "characterized by locks on the doors"
and utilizing "other restrictive hardware designed to restrict the movement of
the residents and protect public safety").
141. See generally BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY
INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH
IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES (2006), http://www.justice
policy.org/images/upload/0611 REPDangersOfDetention JJ.pdf (describing
correctional facilities as comparable to adult prisons and detailing the effects
of detention on juveniles); Sarah Livsey et al., Juvenile Residential Facility
Census, 2004, JUVENILE OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT'L REPORT SERIES BULLE-
TIN (2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1l/ojjdp/222721.pdf (de-
monstrating that many juvenile facilities are overcrowded and utilize con-
finement features).
142. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 141, at 2; cf. ELLIOTT CURRIE,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 61 (1998) (speaking generally of the
costs and consequences of the prison experiment, and specifically of problems
such as overcrowding).
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therefore are plagued with "neglect and violence,"143 including
inmate assaults on staff and other inmates, inmate abuse, and
mental illness. 144 The report focuses on the effects of detention
on young offenders themselves and on the communities from
which they are taken. 145 But it also makes key observations re-
garding the facilities in the process, finding that "[d]etention
centers do serve a role by temporarily supervising . .. youth." 4 6
This role is far removed, however, from the treatment and re-
habilitation envisioned by the founders of the juvenile justice
system.147
Another report released in 2009 by the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention offers a clearer picture of
conditions in secure juvenile facilities. 148 This study also found
that many juvenile facilities housed more residents than they
had standard beds,149 and that the problem of overcrowding
was more pronounced in large, publicly run correctional facili-
ties.150 Furthermore, the study noted that ninety-two percent of
secure juvenile facilities had "confinement features" in addition
to locking juveniles in their rooms to sleep, including internal
security doors to lock youth in specific areas, razor wire, and
external fences or walls.151 Of course, those people who assert
that juvenile confinement remains fundamentally different
from adult confinement may argue that the facility itself is less
important than the programming and treatment opportunities
available within its walls, as posited above. The counterargu-
ment is the same; if a facility is operating at full or overcapaci-
ty and has all the security features of a prison, the purpose of
placing a young person in that facility is likely based more on
punishment than on treatment.
143. HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 141, at 2.
144. See Angie Cannon, Juvenile Injustice, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Aug. 9, 2004, at 30-31.
145. See generally HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 141, at 4-16 (dis-
cussing recidivism rates, the impact of detention on inmates' mental health,
education, employment, and cost effectiveness).
146. Id. at 3.
147. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 48, at 1138 (explaining that one of the origi-
nal purposes of the juvenile system was to treat young offenders, rather than
punish or warehouse them).
148. See generally Livsey et al., supra note 141 (reporting the internal con-
ditions of juvenile facilities nationwide).
149. Id. at 7.
150. See id. at 7-8.
151. See id. at 5-6 (noting that ninety-two percent of detention centers re-
ported confinement features).
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The impact of detention (as opposed to alternative forms of
correction) on recidivism rates, overall crime rate, and govern-
mental budget is a separate debate. The fact that incarceration
in juvenile correctional facilities is shown to have a negative
impact on all of the above, 152 as well as on the mental health,
and the educational and occupational achievement of juvenile
offenders,15 3 is, however, illustrative. Researchers, legislators,
and lawyers know that other means of correction work better
than secure confinement in terms of true rehabilitation. 15 4 De-
spite this knowledge, detention of young offenders continues to
increase.155 This fact further suggests that the true purpose of
juvenile detention is the punishment and warehousing of juve-
niles rather than any form of paternal assistance that would
make the juvenile system fundamentally different from the
adult system.
3. Delinquent Adjudications Are Reused for Punitive
Purposes
One may not be convinced that juvenile justice is entirely
punitive by the argument that the juvenile system has become
too similar to the adult system in its structure, terminology,
and/or facilities. The fact that juvenile adjudications are used
after the fact to punish a young offender, however, is unavoida-
ble.
As discussed above, the rule in Apprendi allows a court to
use a delinquent adjudication to enhance an adult sentence au-
tomatically without independent proof to the jury.'56 Further-
more, adjudications for sex offenses often require the young of-
fender to register as a sex offender for life,15 7 subjecting him to
152. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 141, at 4-8, 10-11 (asserting
that detention does not reduce recidivism, does not reduce the overall crime
rate in communities, and is not cost-effective).
153. See id. at 8-10 (finding that detention inflicts harm upon the mental
health of young inmates and makes it difficult for them to find success in edu-
cation and/or employment endeavors).
154. See, e.g., id. at 16 (citing studies that show alternatives to confinement
that are cost-effective at reducing recidivism).
155. Id. at 2.
156. In both United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003) and
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002), the courts
upheld the use of a juvenile adjudication as a fact of prior conviction to en-
hance a criminal sentence. See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
475-76 (2000).
157. See Carpenter, supra note 96, at 334.
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close scrutiny well into adulthood. 158 Juvenile adjudications
may be used against a person testifying as a witness at an un-
related trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 609.159 And, al-
though not punitive in the legal sense of the word, the ability of
the news media to print accounts of cases involving persons as
young as age fourteen 60 also punishes juvenile offenders by
subjecting them to the same public outrage that the juvenile
system originally intended to protect against. 161
If the purpose of a juvenile adjudication were truly to clear
a path for an individual offender into rehabilitative, treatment-
based programs,162 then the adjudication itself would be ana-
logous to a doctor's written order to fill a prescription. One
would never expect such an order to come back to haunt the pa-
tient in later proceedings. Instead, juvenile adjudications are
treated in much the same way as a guilty verdict or plea for an
adult offender-as a point militating in favor of increased pu-
nishment, supervision, and stigma in the future.
Taken together, both the immediate and subsequent con-
sequences of a delinquent adjudication indicate that the pur-
pose of the system is to punish and not to treat. The purpose is
to make it possible to gather up delinquent juveniles and ware-
house them as we do adult offenders, in jails and prisons that
may seem like good investments, but that offer little more than
paid supervision and high-tech locks on the doors. 163 The pur-
pose is to allow the system to have as much control over an of-
fender for as long as possible, so that more punishment may be
doled out if necessary. The "get tough" movement has not for-
saken juvenile justice. 164
The court in In re L.M. finely characterized the punitive
158. See id. at 334-35 (describing various states' registration require-
ments).
159. FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
160. Cf. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 38-2309(b) (2006)) (noting that the statute requires that official juvenile files
must be open to the public unless the adjudicated child is under the age of
fourteen).
161. See Tanenhaus, supra note 16, at 43 (using the words "sheltered
place" to describe the setting of the juvenile court system).
162. This, of course, was the original plan of the progressive founders of the
system. See, e.g., WATKINS, supra note 14, at 49-50; Feld, supra note 48, at
1138.
163. See generally CURRIE, supra note 142, at 85-109 (explaining the many
problems associated with increased incarceration).
164. See generally Feld, supra note 110 (describing the movement and the
effect of the political environment on juvenile justice policy).
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purpose of the modern juvenile justice system, and provided
many of the same grounds in support that are presented and
supplemented in this Note.165 The punitive purpose, however, is
not the only argument in support of providing the right to a
jury trial in juvenile court. The historical role of juries also pro-
vides courts with a basis for requiring a jury in juvenile pro-
ceedings.
C. THE HISTORIC ROLE OF THE JURY-CHECKING BIAS AND
GOVERNMENT OPPRESSION
The right to a jury trial exists in large part to protect
against possible bias and government oppression166 and there-
fore is most important to preserve in settings in which these
problems are apparent.
Many scholarly commentaries expound the importance of
the jury in protecting against government oppression, ensuring
the protection of individual autonomy in the face of state con-
trol, and allowing for accurate fact-finding. 6 7 In Duncan v.
Louisiana, the Supreme Court expressed this commitment with
language such as "fundamental to the American scheme of jus-
tice"168 and "inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over-
zealous prosecutor."16 9
A closer look at the facts of Duncan reveals also that there
is another, related reason why the opportunity to try one's case
before a jury of peers is so important-to protect against arbi-
trary enforcement of the laws, which often presents itself in the
form of racial bias.170 Gary Duncan was nineteen years old
when tried in 1967.171 His cousins, two younger black kids, had
recently transferred to a previously all-white school pursuant
to a desegregation order.172 They were having trouble with bul-
165. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 168-71.
166. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
167. See AM. BAR FOUND., SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY
ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
BILL OF RIGHTS 7-10 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). See gen-
erally WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 165 (1852) (discussing
the authority of the jury verdict over any witness testimony).
168. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
169. Id. at 156.
170. See Hiroshi Fukurai, A Quota Jury: Affirmative Action in Jury Selec-
tion, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 477, 477-78 (1997).
171. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147.




lying at school. 173 In this racially charged environment, Mr.
Duncan was on his way home one afternoon, and saw his two
cousins on the side of the road confronted by four white boys. 174
He told his cousins to get in his car,176 and allegedly slapped (or
touched-it is not clear) the arm of one of the white boys in the
process.176 Regardless of the resolution of this factual dispute,
it is at least possible that Mr. Duncan's race, and the race of
the boys he allegedly assaulted, played a role in either the
charging of his case or its outcome.177
The era of race riots and marches on Washington and de-
segregation of public schools has perhaps passed, 178 but race is
still a thorny issue in the fields of criminal and juvenile jus-
tice. 179 Reports of disproportionately large numbers of black
men under the supervision of the criminal justice system180 and
on death row 181 abound. Cases in which black offenders harm
white victims are more likely to result in capital charges. 182
The judiciary is made up predominantly white men.183 The pu-
nishment for so-called black drugs is still higher than for their
173. See id. at 4 (asserting that the young cousins had been "assaulted,




177. Cf. id. at 3-4 (referencing repeatedly Mr. Duncan's race, the school
situation, and the race of the boys involved, which indicates that racial tension
was an important factor in at least some aspects of the case).
178. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737,
1788 (2007) (characterizing the "civil rights era" as the decade of the 1960s). It
is quite possible to extend this characterization a few years further back from
this point, with events such as the decision in Brown v. Board of Education as
early as 1954. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
179. See generally HUIZINGA ET AL., supra note 66.
180. See CURRIE, supra note 142, at 13.
181. See, e.g., Laura M. Argys & H. Naci Mocan, Who Shall Live and Who
Shall Die? An Analysis of Prisoners on Death Row in the United States, 33 J.
LEGAL STUD. 255, 278-79 (2004) (noting the problem of minority overrepresen-
tation without determining the precise cause of the disparity).
182. See Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Pu-
nishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807, 811-12 (2008) (suggesting that the race of
both the defendant and the alleged victim interact to produce the situation, in
which black defendants with white victims are the most likely of any subset to
end up on death row).
183. See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1111-12 (2003) (asserting that there is a "lack of judges of
color within the federal judiciary," that "[o]nly 22.6% of active judges are
women" and providing statistics in support of these propositions).
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white counterparts, 184 regardless of the fact that the drugs are
pharmacologically identical. 185 And in the juvenile system, dis-
proportionate minority confinement has become so predomi-
nant that legislatures have structured spending to encourage
states to take action against the problem. 186
Some of the above problems, including disproportionate
minority contact, meet time and again with the counterargu-
ment that minorities simply commit more crime. 187 If this is the
case, then police and prosecutors cannot help but arrest and in-
carcerate them at a higher rate than the white population. For
some crimes, this may be accurate, 188 but the research shows
that the level of disparity cannot be easily explained away with
the answer "they commit more crime," 189 and is instead consis-
tent with racial bias remaining a very real problem. 190
Racial bias, when acted upon in an official capacity (such
as on the part of a police officer or a county attorney) is a form
of arbitrary law enforcement and government oppression of cer-
tain populations191-precisely the sort of problem that juries
can guard against.192 When the colonists faced criminal charges
in 1776, they wanted juries of their peers to decide their guilt
or innocence rather than members of the king's loyal entou-
184. See Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After
Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 1133-34 (2008) (noting that African Ameri-
cans constitute the defendants in the vast majority of crack cocaine convictions
and are sentenced to disproportionately longer prison terms than Caucasian
drug offenders).
185. Id. at 1134.
186. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002, 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006).
187. This argument is noted by David Huizinga et al. in their report on the
subject to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. See HUI-
ZINGA ET AL., supra note 66, at 1.
188. See id. at 24. The author reports that minorities appear to commit
more violent and property offenses than do whites. Id.
189. Id. at ii, 41. Statistically controlling for self-reported offending allowed
the study authors to assert that "levels of delinquent offending have only mar-
ginal effects on the level of DMC." Id. at 26, 41.
190. See id. at ii (noting that racial bias is consistent with but does not nec-
essarily explain disproportionate minority contact in the juvenile justice sys-
tem).
191. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 110, at 1469-70 (describing the manner and
consequences of racially biased law enforcement in the South before the civil
rights era).
192. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (citing oppres-
sion by the government and arbitrary enforcement of the law as reasons to
provide a criminal defendant with a jury of his peers).
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rage. 193 In much the same way, an African-American or His-
panic alleged offender may want a jury to include members of
her geographical, racial, or cultural community, who might
have a more open mind regarding persons who look like her.194
Systems plagued with problems of racial disparity and
probable discrimination have an incentive to rely on the prov-
ince of the jury to guard against making the problem even
worse. 195 This is true of the juvenile justice system, with its
well-documented problem of disproportionate minority con-
finement.196 Juries of laypersons may not always reach differ-
ent conclusions than a judge would. Perhaps racial disparity
would continue to be an issue even if juries were available.
Taking this as true, however, allowing guilt to be determined
by a jury as opposed to a single judge would increase the ap-
pearance of the legitimacy of the outcome,197 and perhaps in-
crease confidence in the system as well.198 As with so many as-
pects of criminal justice, appearances and public perception are
important components of due process; 199 the juvenile justice
system is no different in this regard.
A recent occurrence, although not specifically related to
race, sums up the point regarding the propensity for govern-
ment oppression and abuse of discretion in the juvenile justice
system. In February 2009, two judges in Pennsylvania pled
guilty to taking kickbacks in consideration for sending juvenile
offenders who otherwise would have been sentenced to proba-
tion to private correctional facilities. 200 Aside from the fact that
these official (and appalling) acts of judicial discretion likely
193. See id. at 152 ("Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply re-
sented.").
194. This was the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in deciding
that using race as the basis for impaneling a jury, when the result was a ho-
mogenous jury different in race from the defendant, was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954).
195. See Fukurai, supra note 170, at 477-78.
196. See generally HUIZINGA ET AL., supra note 66 (discussing several fac-
tors that might affect disproportionate minority contact).
197. This need for legitimacy and confidence is well known in the field of
criminal justice and many commentators have made note of it. Cf. Fukurai,
supra note 170, at 477-78 (noting that juries containing members of the same
race as defendants are commonly regarded as having greater legitimacy than
are racially homogeneous juries).
198. Cf. id. (noting the importance of juries that mirror the racial
characteristics of defendants).
199. Id.
200. See Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to
Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22.
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ruined young lives, and the fact that officials may never know
just how many juveniles were affected,201 the situation sends a
powerful message.
The juvenile justice system is no longer so different from
the adult system to warrant different and fewer due process
protections. The propensity for inappropriate and biased exer-
cises of judicial discretion coupled with the punitive nature of
the system combine to make juries necessary in juvenile court.
III. PROVIDE JURIES IN JUVENILE COURT-BUT WORK
TO MAKE THEM UNNECESSARY
In light of the purpose the juvenile court currently serves,
the consequences it doles out, and the manner in which it dis-
proportionately affects minority youth, the right to a trial by
jury is a necessity in juvenile court. Juries consisting of a rep-
resentative cross-section of the adult community should thus be
provided to all young offenders facing incarceration. This solu-
tion, however, needs last only so long as the juvenile system
remains untrue to its rehabilitative roots.
A. THE TEMPORARY SOLUTION: JURY TRIALS FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS
In light of the punitive purpose of the juvenile court system
and current problems of racial disparity, the right to a jury tri-
al for juvenile offenders is a procedural necessity. The jury is a
fundamental safeguard of the rights of the accused, 202 whether
youth or adult. Juries should thus be provided to all juvenile
offenders in the same manner that they are provided to
adults-in other words, any time a juvenile is accused of a
crime for which the sentence may include incarceration.
Of course, providing juries will be another expenditure of
resources, 203 which would perhaps further strain a system
already at its fiscal breaking point. Having juries in the
courtroom will also, by definition, deplete the confidential
nature of juvenile hearings. The expenditure of resources
argument is fair, especially in light of the current economic
environment. Just as constitutional protections are jealously
201. See id. (stating that more than 5000 juveniles appeared before the
judge since the scheme began, but providing no definite evidence of the num-
ber of offenders that were sentenced inappropriately).
202. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
203. See Kalven, supra note 33, at 1059-60 (noting that bench trials are
forty percent less time consuming than jury trials).
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guarded in the criminal system 204 no matter their cost,
however, so must they be guarded for juvenile offenders. In
response to the argument about confidentiality, the confidential
nature of the juvenile system has already been largely
eroded. 205 The loss of confidentiality is one of the reasons
justifying providing juries in the first place. 206
The solution, or at least the discussion, must not end here.
Underlying the determination of what due process safeguards
are necessary right now is the question of whether the safe-
guards will always be necessary. Alternatively, should policy-
makers endeavor to return the juvenile justice system to its
roots in individualistic treatment, and rehabilitation such that
perhaps the "trappings" of criminal justice are truly not re-
quired?207
B. FAST FORWARD: IS THIS THE WAY WE WANT JUVENILE
JUSTICE TO FUNCTION?
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has suggested that
remedial actions are constitutionally required for a time, but
will not remain necessary forever.208 Such may be the case with
providing juries to juvenile offenders. When the Supreme Court
decided Grutter v. Bollinger (an affirmative action case argued
under the Equal Protection Clause), it asserted that race-based
affirmative action, when done correctly, was "narrowly tai-
lored" to the "compelling interest" of diversity in higher educa-
tion. 209 The Court was careful to leave itself an escape hatch.
Since the use of race as a factor for admission to law school at
all, whether it favored white students, black students, or who-
mever, was not easy to condone under the Constitution,210 lan-
204. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 ("[M]any of the rights guaranteed by
the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected
against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.").
205. For a discussion of this issue, see In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan.
2008).
206. See id. (characterizing the lack of confidentiality as yet another factor
making the juvenile system indistinguishable from the adult system).
207. This was the original intention. See Feld, supra note 48, at 1138-39.
208. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341-43 (2003) (anticipat-
ing that law school affirmative action admissions programs will "no longer be
necessary" in twenty-five years).
209. Id. at 343.
210. See id. at 341-42 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its
terms, prohibits all classification based on race, and therefore such "classifica-
tions, however compelling their goals, are potentially ... dangerous").
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guage was included to suggest that as soon as it was no longer
necessary to remedy the evils of past discrimination, the prac-
tice should cease. 211
The decision to provide a jury in juvenile delinquency cases
may warrant the same treatment, because if changes are made
to the system such that the court really acts as parens patriae,
thus fulfilling its core rehabilitative principles, 212 the formalis-
tic due process protections would be extraneous. 213 The ques-
tion becomes whether such a return to rehabilitation is desira-
ble.
C. THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF A RETURN TO REHABILITATION
Research shows that a return to rehabilitation is good cor-
rectional policy. For instance, rehabilitative programs such as
multisystemic therapy, in which offenders remain in their
communities and are subject to intensive correctional interven-
tion, are widely considered to be highly effective forms of reha-
bilitation. 214 Multisystemic therapy and similar programs are
more of an expense up front, 215 but the return on the invest-
ment in the form of reduced recidivism rate and fewer people in
prison over time makes the program ultimately cost-
effective. 216 This cost-effectiveness point perhaps rings even
more true when the offenders being treated and/or rehabili-
tated are young, with many years ahead of them in which they
could burden the system-or not. In the face of anticrime rhe-
toric, and the ease of claiming a "get tough" platform, it is al-
ways difficult to argue for something that appears more le-
211. Id. at 341-43.
212. Upholding these principles is, not to overstate the point, the original
intention of the juvenile justice system. See generally WATKINS, supra note 14,
at 46-60 (discussing the original intentions of the juvenile justice system).
213. See Feld, supra note 48, at 1138-40 (making the point that the due
process safeguards available to adults were not available to juveniles because
of the focus on the "best interests of the child").
214. Alan Carr, Contributions to the Study of Violence & Trauma: Multisys-
temic Therapy, Exposure Therapy, Attachment Styles, and Therapy Process Re-
search, 20 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 426, 427-29 (2005).
215. Cf. Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Reha-
bilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects, in 3 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, at 109,
152-53 (Julie Horney et al. eds., 2000) (describing the numerous preemptive
actions which are part of a multisystemic therapy program).
216. See id. at 152 ("[Multisystemic therapy] has achieved reductions in re-
cidivism and has been cost effective."); Carr, supra note 214, at 429
("[O]utcome data . . . show[s] that multisystemic therapy is less costly and
more effective than routine community-based service and residential servic-
es.").
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nient, or too "soft."2 17 The social-science research shows, how-
ever, that this argument could be won.2 18 When it was said that
"nothing works" when it comes to the rehabilitation of offenders
in the 1970s, 219 not much had yet been tried. 220 Today it is poss-
ible to argue the alternative. 221
A strong counterargument posits that perhaps we should
integrate juvenile justice with criminal justice,222 and protect
young offenders by offering "youth discounts" for their age at
the time of the offense. 223 Arguably, this is what already occurs.
Juvenile courts transfer a large, and growing, 224 number of
young offenders to adult court, where the youth is then treated
as an adult in all senses of that word. 2 2 5 In states with sentenc-
ing guidelines,226 a judge may depart from the recommended
217. Feld, supra note 110, at 1451-52, 1505-07 (discussing the political
dynamics of being "tough" or "soft" on crime).
218. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 214, at 427-29; Cullen & Gendreau, supra
note 215, at 152.
219. Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Pris-
on Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 48 (commonly known as the "nothing
works" article).
220. Cf. Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 215, at 127, 130-31 (noting that
cognitive behavioral programs had not been tried in 1974 and that Martinson
himself later noted that the conditions of program delivery could have a signif-
icant positive effect).
221. See, e.g., id. at 124-33 (reviewing and rebuking the "nothing works"
study and its results); Carr, supra note 214, at 427-29.
222. See Feld, supra note 17, at 253-54 ("[P]unitive transfer laws and
harsher delinquency sentences . . . have transformed the system into a scaled-
down second-class criminal court for juveniles."); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the
Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 69 (1997) [hereinafter Feld, Abolish the Ju-
venile Court] ("[A] state could try all offenders in one integrated criminal
court, albeit with modifications to respond to the youthfulness of younger de-
fendants.").
223. See Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v.
Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 55-65 (2008) [hereinafter Feld, Slower Form of Death]
(arguing for the "youth discount" when children are tried and sentenced as
adults); Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 222, at 115-33 (stating
that a "youth discount" is an essential part of effective juvenile justice policy).
224. See Feld, Slower Form of Death, supra note 223, at 11-14 (discussing
the mechanisms used by states to try more than 255,000 juveniles as adults
annually and the ways that states made this transfer easier in the early
1990s).
225. Id. at 16.
226. Many states now do have such guidelines. See NEAL B. KAUDER &
BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 4 (2008), http://www.pewcenteronthestates
.org/uploadedFiles/NCSCSentencing-GuidelinesprofilesJuly_2008.pdf. The
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sentence if either aggravating or mitigating factors are
present. 227 Provided that a sentence is not mandatory,228 a
judge can already offer a "youth discount" if she finds that the
age of the offender makes him less culpable or his offense less
egregious. 229 The problem with this structure is the fact that a
court can also find an offender's young age to be an aggravating
rather than a mitigating factor.230 Judges are not immune from
rhetoric and the need to "get tough" on young criminals.231 That
some crimes, especially violent person crimes, can be commit-
ted by a person not yet old enough to hold a learner's permit is
disconcerting, and is perhaps the reason that the "youth dis-
count" theory has not yet taken hold.2 32
The "youth discount" proposal has merit, but may provide
both too much and not enough of a solution to the problem. In-
stead, the separation between juvenile and criminal should be
maintained, and an attempt made to return the system, if not
to 1899, at least to its core principles of rehabilitation and indi-
vidualization. 233 The founders of the juvenile justice system not
only recognized that juveniles were different, but that each was
different from the next. 2 34 The system was designed not only to
be less harsh, but to be tailored to an individual offender's
guidelines in place in Minnesota have been the "most heralded and emulated
as a model," and thus serve as an illustrative example in this context. Blake
Nelson, The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects of Determinate Sen-
tencing on Disparities in Sentencing Decisions, 10 LAW & INEQ. 217, 222
(1992).
227. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.D cmt. II.D.01
(2009).
228. But see Feld, Slower Form of Death, supra note 223, at 9 (pointing out
that life without parole sentences for juveniles are mandatory in some juris-
dictions).
229. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.D.2(a)(5) (providing
that "[o]ther substantial grounds ... which tend to excuse or mitigate the of-
fender's culpability" can be considered); cf. id. § II.D.1 (indicating that age is
not among factors that may not be used as the basis of a sentencing depar-
ture).
230. See, e.g., People v. DeSantis, 831 P.2d 1210, 1243 (Cal. 1992); State v.
Butler, No. 2001CA00069, 2002 WL 253853, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19,
2002).
231. See Feld, supra note 110, at 1562.
232. Cf. Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,
and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1496 (2008) (noting "the
specter of youth violence" in the continuing nature of the debate over juvenile
justice policy).





needs. 235 It is this second half of the equation that is missing
from the "youth discount" plan.
The options available for reform in the juvenile court may
be expressed as a tripartite choice-allow juvenile justice to
continue as a punitive system, but provide all appropriate due
process safeguards (such as requiring juries in the system as it
functions today); stop pretending that the juvenile court is sep-
arate and recognize that kids are different in a new way (the
youth discount); or return the system to its original rehabilita-
tive purposes. 236 It has been said that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."2 3 7 This
sentiment certainly has the ring of truth, but at base, the ulti-
mate abandonment of a system designed with the best interests
of children in mind is perhaps frightening as well.2 38
Courts and legislatures should maintain the separation be-
tween adult and juvenile justice and seek an eventual return to
the original intentions and practices of the juvenile court. A re-
turn to rehabilitation would not be especially easy, or perhaps
popular, but with a judicious allocation of resources such a
transformation is possible. To the extent that requiring a jury
in juvenile court is seen as simply too expensive or too time-
consuming to fathom, such a requirement may even act as a
necessary ultimatum prodding the system to make rehabilita-
tive reform efforts. If this were to happen, a court would need
to consider factors such as the purposes of the system, propen-
sity for racial disparity, and the historical rationale behind the
constitutional right at issue to make the determination of
which precise due process safeguards to provide.
CONCLUSION
For so long as the juvenile justice system remains a
"scaled-down, second-class criminal court for young people," 2 3 9
juveniles have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Juveniles
are still different, but they are not so different that they can be
denied due process of the law. A new evaluation of due process
rights will be necessary if and when the juvenile justice system
is made rehabilitative not only in name but in practice. The de-
235. Id.
236. This tripartite framework was expressed concisely by Judge Crippen
in In re D.S.F. 416 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Minn. 1987) (Crippen, J., dissenting).
237. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
238. In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d at 778 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
239. Feld, supra note 17, at 253-54.
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sirability of this eventual outcome may be disputed, but regard-
less of the ongoing debate, the fact that the right to a trial by
jury is constitutionally required right now is inescapable. Juve-
nile delinquents may not be the same as adult criminals, but
they are being given the same treatment and consequences by
the justice system. The same due process rights-the right to a
trial by jury-should follow.
&
